








The digital age sparked an explosion both in the quantity of pri-
vate information that a government can gather on private citizens, 
and in the rapidity with which such information, once leaked, can 
spread across the globe.1  As the recent controversy involving Nation-
al Security Agency (“NSA”) surveillance of phone and Internet com-
munications demonstrates, governments are eager to take advantage 
of this new capacity.2  In such an age, citizens’ rights to privacy are in-
creasingly crucial.  The right to decisional privacy—to be free from 
government interference when making personal decisions about such 
things as procreation and sexuality—has been affirmed and clarified 
by the United States Supreme Court in a series of decisions over the 
last half century.3  But the informational aspect of this “right to be let 
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 1 See, e.g., Margaret B. Hoppin, Overly Intimate Surveillance:  Why Emergent Public Health Sur-
veillance Programs Deserve Strict Scrutiny Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1950, 1957–61 (2012) (discussing New York City’s A1C registry, which requires laborato-
ries to report to a centralized registry the results of residents’ hemoglobin tests—9.4 mil-
lion tests on 3.4 million people as of 2011—which can reveal information about individu-
al diets, stress levels, and other lifestyle choices). 
 2 See, e.g., James Risen & Laura Poitras, N.S.A. Gathers Data on Social Connections of U.S. Citi-
zens, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 28, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/29/us/nsa-examines-
social-networks-of-us-citizens.html?_r=0 (describing the NSA policy of collecting phone 
and e-mail logs and compiling this data to create graphs of social connections, locations, 
and other personal information). 
 3 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (“Persons in a homosexual relation-
ship may seek autonomy for these purposes . . . .”); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53 
(1973) (finding that a right to privacy protects a woman’s choice to abort a pregnancy). 
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alone”4—to avoid disclosure of personal information about oneself, 
either to the government or to the world at large—remains on tenu-
ous footing in the United States.5  Existing legislative and regulatory 
protections leave frightening gaps, and the text of the Constitution 
gives courts little material with which to fill those holes.  Without a 
clear textual foundation, the courts have little authority to vindicate 
such a right when it is violated by the other two branches of govern-
ment and little guidance for determining its boundaries.6  A series of 
Supreme Court cases reached inconclusive decisions that have done 
little to clarify the situation, leaving the lower courts to move in dif-
ferent directions.7 
The situation is markedly different in Europe.  There, a definitive 
textual basis for the right has been clarified by the European Court of 
Human Rights (“ECtHR”)8 and implemented into the laws of mem-
ber states, where it has been vigorously enforced.9  Not only does the 
right possess stronger footing, but it extends further, affecting not 
only the responsibilities of governments, but also those of private ac-
tors such as corporations and individuals.10  Europe protects informa-
tional privacy so thoroughly for a reason:  it is a fundamental human 
right, important to the development of self-identity and essential to 
the freedom to be one’s self.11  In the United States, the right to in-
 
 4 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 5 See, e.g., NASA v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 751 (2011) (declining to settle whether a right to 
informational privacy exists, what sorts of information it might cover, and what level of 
scrutiny intrusions must bear, and deciding only that the circumstances before the Court 
did not amount to a violation). 
 6 See id. at 757 n.10 (“[W]here we have only the ‘scarce and open-ended’ guideposts of sub-
stantive due process to show us the way, . . . the Court has repeatedly recognized the ben-
efits of proceeding with caution.” (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 
115, 125 (1992))); id. at 767 (Scalia, J., concurring) (criticizing the majority for not clari-
fying the issue for the lower courts); Ingrid Schüpbach Martin, The Right to Stay in the Clos-
et:  Information Disclosures by Government Officials, 32 SETON HALL L. REV. 407, 422–28, 430 
(2002) (arguing that federal courts are reluctant to allow claims “based solely on the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s general protection of life and liberty” because lack of guidance 
forces the court into judicial legislating to fill in the gaps and may carry it beyond its con-
stitutional authority). 
 7 See Martin, supra note 6, at 412–27 (discussing Supreme Court jurisprudence on informa-
tional privacy and its various conflicting interpretations by the lower courts). 
 8 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and Proto-
col art. 8, Council of Europe, 4 Nov. 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter CPHR] (codify-
ing a “right to respect for . . . private and family life”). 
 9 These points will be discussed in further detail in Part II, infra. 
 10 See, e.g., Mosley v. News Grp. Newspapers Ltd., [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB) (awarding dam-
ages for breach of confidence and unauthorized disclosure of private information when a 
newspaper printed details of a sadomasochistic orgy). 
 11 Koen Lemmens, The Protection of Privacy Between a Rights-Based and a Freedom-Based Ap-
proach:  What the Swiss Example Can Teach Us, 10 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 381, 383–
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formational privacy is conceived of only as an interest in avoiding 
embarrassment, covering less ground and deserving less protection.  
This Comment will attempt to show that Europe is correct to see 
more in privacy and that the right deserves more than an assumption 
to protect it.  This conclusion has implications for all branches of 
government, but this Comment will discuss only the potential consti-
tutional right, enforceable by the judiciary when infringed by the leg-
islative or executive branch, as opposed to any statutory or regulatory 
rights governing private individuals or corporations. 
Part I will discuss the state of informational privacy law in the 
United States.  Part I.A shows that the Supreme Court has left the 
question open, providing little guidance to lower courts on how to 
deal with informational privacy cases that come before them.  Part I.B 
describes the consequences of this indecision:  variation among the 
circuits, ad hoc judicial decisions, confusion, and under- or over-
protection, depending on your point of view.  Part II traces European 
informational privacy jurisprudence to show that broader, clearer 
protections are both desirable and feasible.  Part III argues that the 
Supreme Court should follow Europe’s example in providing clear 
guidance on a robust right to informational privacy that protects any 
information in which individuals have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. 
I.  THE STATE OF U.S. LAW 
The Supreme Court has articulated two aspects of the right to pri-
vacy:  the “decisional” aspect that protects a sphere of private deci-
sion-making in which the government may not interfere12 and the “in-
formational” aspect that protects citizens from disclosure of private 
information about them.13  However, the Court has never confirmed 
that this second facet exists as a bona fide constitutional right.14 
 
84 (2003) (describing the right to privacy as a mask that allows us to create the persona 
we show the world and the individual behind it). 
 12 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564–67 (2003) (“The liberty protected by the 
Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to [find overt expression in intimate 
conduct with another person].”); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965) (“In 
other words, the First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected from gov-
ernmental intrusion.”). 
 13 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977). 
 14 Jed Storey Crumbo, Constitutional Law—Right to Privacy—Government Contract Employees’ 
Right to Informational Privacy:  Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin. v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746 
(2011), 79 TENN. L. REV. 417, 420 (2012)(“Although the Court could have addressed the 
issue of whether a constitutional right to informational privacy existed at all, the majority 
opinion stressed that this broad issue was not before the Court.”). 
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Four times, an informational privacy right has come before the 
Court, and each time, the Court concluded that there had been no 
violation, but without determining whether a right existed to be vio-
lated or not.15  Nor has the Court given much indication of what sorts 
of information the right would protect or what sort of scrutiny any in-
vasion would have to bear.  This indecision has sparked much disa-
greement among academics and circuit courts.16 
A.  Supreme Court Jurisprudence:  It Might Protect Something, But It Doesn’t 
Protect This 
A constitutional right to informational privacy was at first denied, 
obliquely, in Paul v. Davis.17  There, the plaintiff was arrested for 
shoplifting, to which he pleaded not guilty.18  Before the case was 
tried or his guilt established, the local police distributed fliers to local 
businesses labeling the plaintiff and others as “active shoplifters.”19  
The plaintiff sued the police officers in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, 
claiming that his constitutional rights had been violated.20  The Court 
spent the bulk of its opinion denying that damage to reputation 
alone could be a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Pro-
cess Clause because it was not a deprivation of liberty or property.21  
Moreover, the Court denied that there was a constitutional protec-
tion of privacy against the “public[ation of] a record of an official act 
such as an arrest.”22  It did not discuss whether a right to nondisclo-
sure existed in general, so it is possible to interpret the decision as 
saying no more than that arrest records are too public to implicate a 
 
 15 NASA v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 751 (2011) (“We assume, without deciding, that the Con-
stitution protects a privacy right of the sort mentioned in Whalen and Nixon.”); Nixon v. 
Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 457 (1977) (finding no violation, but acknowledging 
that “public officials . . . are not wholly without constitutionally protected privacy rights in 
matters of personal life”); Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605 (finding no violation, but stating that 
the Court was “not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast 
amounts of personal information”); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712–13 (1976) (holding 
that there is no constitutional protection against disclosure of the plaintiff’s arrest on a 
shoplifting charge). 
 16 See, e.g., Martin, supra note 6, at 439–40 (evaluating the various judicial opinions on the 
subject and suggesting an analytical framework for informational privacy cases). 
 17 See Paul, 424 U.S. at 712–13 (holding that there is no constitutional protection against 
disclosure of the plaintiff’s arrest on a shoplifting charge). 
 18 Id. at 696–97. 
 19 Id. at 695. 
 20 Id. at 694. 
 21 Id. at 699–712.  The Due Process Clause guarantees, “nor shall any State deprive any per-
son of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1. 
 22 Paul, 424 U.S. at 713. 
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privacy right.23  The holding was phrased narrowly enough to allow 
for a latent right to informational privacy that protects against disclo-
sures other than records of official acts.24 
On the other hand, the Court noted that other privacy cases—
those in the decisional privacy line—were limited to rights that were 
“‘fundamental’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’”25  It 
would be odd for the Court to describe the limits of decisional priva-
cy if it did not mean to apply those limitations to the informational 
privacy claim at hand.  Nevertheless, after listing the spheres deemed 
“fundamental” rights, it stated, “In these areas it has been held that 
there are limitations on the States’ power to substantively regulate con-
duct.”26  It did not mention any limitations to the State’s power to dis-
close private information.27 
Thus, Paul did not clarify whether a right to informational privacy 
existed.  Nor did it clarify, if such a right did exist, whether it was lim-
ited to the narrow class of “fundamental” rights protected from gov-
ernment interference by the decisional sphere or whether a broader 
informational sphere could be protected as long as the information 
was more private than official arrest records.  Later Supreme Court 
cases hypothesizing such a right did not deem it necessary to recon-
cile or overrule Paul. 
1. The Immaculate Conception:  Whalen v. Roe 
Only one year later, the Supreme Court hypothesized the right to 
informational privacy into being with Whalen v. Roe.28  In Whalen, the 
plaintiffs challenged a New York law mandating the creation of a da-
tabase including the name, age, and address of everyone who was 
prescribed a Schedule II drug (drugs with recognized medical uses 
but high potential for abuse) and the doctors who prescribed them.29  
The Supreme Court assured plaintiffs that it was “not unaware of the 
threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast amounts of per-
 
 23 See id. at 712–13 (dismissing the privacy claim without mentioning a right to nondisclo-
sure). 
 24 Id. at 713 (calling the instant claim “far afield” from Roe v. Wade). 
 25 Id. (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). 
 26 Id. (emphasis added). 
 27 Id. (rejecting the claim that “the State may not publicize a record of an official act such as 
an arrest”). 
 28 429 U.S. 589, 600 (1977) (suggesting that a “sufficiently grievous threat” to the “interest 
in the nondisclosure of private information and . . . [the] interest in making important 
decisions independently” may establish a constitutional violation). 
 29 Id. at 592–93 (describing the procedure that physicians must follow to report information 
to the New York State Department of Health). 
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sonal information in computerized data banks or other massive gov-
ernment files.”30  It recognized that an “interest in privacy” was impli-
cated by potential disclosure of the collected information, and that 
“statutory or regulatory dut[ies] to avoid unwarranted disclo-
sures . . . arguably [have their] roots in the Constitution.”31 
However, the Court was satisfied that the information was protect-
ed from disclosure.32  The state was required to store the database in a 
vault, reading it only with a computer running without outside con-
nections and surrounded by a barbed-wire fence.33  Willful disclosure 
of the information was punishable by up to one year in prison.34  Giv-
en these protections against dissemination of the collected infor-
mation, the Court declined to find sufficient intrusion for a constitu-
tional violation, even if a right to informational privacy existed.35 
The decision in Whalen, then, rests on an insufficient degree of 
risk of public disclosure.  It largely ignores any potential violation 
from mere collection of private data.36  The Court acknowledged that 
a handful of government agents responsible for coding the data 
would be able to read it, but it was enough for the Court’s majority 
that the degree of disclosure was little different from prior law or 
from the medical disclosures made to insurance companies.37  The 
decision did not establish whether there were some sorts of infor-
mation that could not be collected without disclosure, or whether an 
unwarranted disclosure would be a violation. 
The majority of the Court thus did not find an infringement that 
was justified; rather, it denied an infringement in the first place.38  It 
therefore left open the question of what level of scrutiny a violation 
might need to bear to pass constitutional muster:  what level of com-
peting government interest would justify a violation, and how close 
the relationship between the government act and the government in-
terest must be.39  It opined that New York had a “vital interest in con-
 
 30 Id. at 605. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. at 600–02. 
 33 Id. at 593–94. 
 34 Id. at 594–95. 
 35 Id. at 603–04. 
 36 Id. at 600–04 (discussing the potential effects of the disclosure of medical records but not 
the effects of the collection of the records). 
 37 Id. at 602. 
 38 Id. at 600 (“We are persuaded, however, that the New York program does not, on its face, 
pose a sufficiently grievous threat to either interest to establish a constitutional viola-
tion.”). 
 39 The Court has elaborated on a variety of tests that it uses to evaluate whether the gov-
ernment may justifiably infringe upon a constitutional right, with tiers of scrutiny based 
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trolling the distribution of dangerous drugs” and that the data collec-
tion was a “reasonable exercise of [its] broad police powers,”40 but 
this does not tell us whether a less vital interest would have been suf-
ficient to justify collection, or whether the elaborate protections limit-
ing access to the data were sufficient to make the statute’s invasion 
“narrowly tailored.”  Furthermore, this discussion seems more like a 
rebuttal to the lower court’s holding that the law was overbroad than 
like support for its own position, as it occurs in the introductory sec-
tion.41 
Adding to the inconclusiveness of the decision, the majority opin-
ion is flanked by two competing concurrences.  Justice William Bren-
nan would have held that this level of collection is acceptable because 
it is “familiar . . . and [is] not generally regarded as an invasion of pri-
vacy.”42  He insisted, however, that not only would broad disclosure of 
the information “clearly implicate constitutionally protected privacy 
rights, and would presumably be justified only by compelling state in-
terests,” but that mere collection in a centralized computer database 
might rise to a constitutional violation in a more extreme case.43  Jus-
tice Potter Stewart, on the other hand, concurred separately to deny 
any right to informational privacy.44 
 
upon the strength of the right.  Strict scrutiny, applied to such actions as racial classifica-
tions under the Equal Protection Clause and to restrictions of free speech on the basis of 
the content of that speech, requires a “compelling government interest” and that the ac-
tion be “narrowly tailored” so that the infringement is no greater than necessary to fur-
ther that interest.  See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005) (“[T]he gov-
ernment has the burden of proving that racial classifications are narrowly tailored 
measures that further compelling governmental interests.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 776–77 (2002) (evaluating a 
content-based restriction of speech for compelling state interest and narrow tailoring).  
Intermediate scrutiny applies to gender-based classifications, requiring that any such law 
be “substantially related” to “important governmental objectives.”  Craig v. Boren, 429 
U.S. 190, 197 (1976).  Where the government seeks only to regulate economic activity, for 
instance, the Court asks no more than for the regulation to be “rationally related” to a 
“legitimate” interest, and is very deferential as to what might be rational.  See, e.g., Wil-
liamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (“It is enough that there is an 
evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative 
measure was a rational way to correct it.”). 
40  Whalen, 429. U.S. at 598.  
 41 Id. at 596–97. 
 42 Id. at 606 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 43 Id. at 606–07. 
 44 Id. at 607–08 (Stewart, J., concurring) (rejecting Justice Brennan’s proposition that 
“[b]road dissemination by state officials of [the information collected by New York 
State] . . . would clearly implicate constitutionally protected rights” (alteration in origi-
nal)). 
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2. Elaboration Without Clarification:  Nixon and NASA 
Having left matters thoroughly unclear and somewhat unstable, 
the Court, in the same Term, took a second case implicating privacy.  
In Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, the Court considered the 
constitutionality of an act authorizing presidential archivists to read 
through former President Nixon’s presidential papers to sort out the 
private ones from the millions of pages of non-private ones produced 
during his tenure.45  Again, the Court noted an “interest in avoiding 
the disclosure of personal matters”46 and held that Nixon had a “legit-
imate expectation of privacy” in some of the materials.47  “Legitimate 
expectations” were not considered either in Whalen,48 or later in NASA 
v. Nelson.49  They are, however, important to search and seizure analy-
sis under the Fourth Amendment.50  The Nixon Court proceeded to 
analogize the question to a case of electronic surveillance.51  There-
fore, it is possible that the Court was considering the case under 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence rather than intending to clarify 
informational privacy law, although the Court has since stated that 
informational privacy rights were implicated.52 
As in Whalen, the Nixon Court concluded that the privacy claim 
was without merit.53  It listed several factors for this conclusion:  the 
“limited intrusion” of a screening; the fact that the vast majority of 
the documents were not private and could be separated out only by 
professional screening; the “important public interest” in the non-
private documents; and the “unblemished record of the archivists for 
discretion.”54  There is no indication whether the Court based its de-
 
 45 433 U.S. 425, 429–30 (1977). 
 46 Id. at 457 (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 at 599 (1977)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 47 Id. at 458. 
 48 429 U.S. 589 (1977). 
 49 NASA v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 751 (2011)(holding that the Government’s “question-
naire that asks employees about treatment or counseling for recent illegal-drug use” did 
not violate the privacy interests discussed in Whalen or Nixon). 
 50 See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[A] 
person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy; . . . electronic 
as well as physical intrusion into a place that is in this sense private may constitute a viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment . . . .”).  The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of 
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasona-
ble searches and seizures . . . .”  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 51 Nixon, 433 U.S. at 463. 
 52 See NASA, 131 S. Ct. at 751 (“We assume, without deciding, that the Constitution protects 
a privacy right of the sort mentioned in Whalen and Nixon.”). 
 53 Nixon, 433 U.S. at 465. 
 54 Id. 
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cision on the confluence of all factors or whether any subset would 
have been sufficient.  The Court may have considered that there was 
no violation because access to the files was restricted to professional 
archivists, or it may have considered that even this limited intrusion 
would have been a violation but for the “important public interest.”  
It is also possible that a less important interest or a less narrowly tai-
lored act would still have passed whatever scrutiny was applied to the 
case. 
The Supreme Court remained silent on the issue of informational 
privacy for thirty-three years before hearing NASA v. Nelson.55  There, 
the question was whether a government background check violated a 
right to informational privacy by compelling employees to disclose 
past use or manufacturing of illegal drugs and any treatment that 
they might have undergone for that use, as well as certain open-
ended questions to references.56  Again the Court decided to “assume, 
without deciding, that the Constitution protects a privacy right of the 
sort mentioned in Whalen and Nixon.”57  The majority opinion consid-
ered a number of factors, including:  the greater scope accorded to 
the government in its role as employer than as sovereign; the fact that 
such background checks had long been performed on civil servants 
(but were only recently being extended to independent contractors 
like the plaintiffs); the government’s strong interest in ensuring that 
its employees are competent and reliable (for which, substance abuse 
is supposedly a good predictor); the important (if non-sensitive) na-
ture of plaintiffs’ jobs; the statutory protections against data disclo-
sure; and the assertion that the question regarding counseling was in-
tended to mitigate a positive response to the drug use question.58  
Ultimately, the Court concluded that no right had been violated.59 
NASA answered very few questions, though.  Informational privacy 
remained a hypothetical right, its contents and its weight unclear.  
The Court expressly denied that the government was obligated to jus-
tify its actions under a least restrictive means test, at least where it act-
ed as an employer rather than a regulator.60  However, if the govern-
ment is not required to use the least restrictive means necessary, must 
 
 55 131 S. Ct. 746 (2011). 
 56 Id. at 753. 
 57 Id. at 751. 
 58 Id. at 757–60. 
 59 Id. at 763–64. 
 60 Id. at 760 (“We reject the argument that the Government, when it requests job-related 
personal information in an employment background check, has a constitutional burden 
to demonstrate that its questions are ‘necessary’ or the least restrictive means of further-
ing its interests.”). 
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the means be substantially related to an important goal, or merely ra-
tionally related to a legitimate one?  Or is there no need to scrutinize 
the choice at all because the right cannot be violated absent a signifi-
cant risk of disclosure?  Again, the Court analyzed the Government’s 
interests and the reasonableness of its measures but told us only that 
there was no violation.  It did not say whether this was because there 
was no infringement or because the infringement was justified, or 
some combination thereof.61  Nor did it say what level of justification 
would be required if there were an infringement.62  It noted that an 
“ironclad disclosure bar” is unnecessary to protect privacy rights.63  A 
“remote possibility” of public disclosure and an exception for “rou-
tine use,” allowing the employer’s referees limited access to the in-
formation, is apparently not sufficient to be a violation.64  But much 
ground remains open in the middle, and the Court has provided lit-
tle guidance to clarify it. 
3. And Yet, Informational Privacy Lives On:  United States  v. Jones 
It may appear from the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence thus far—
zero for three in the cases directly referencing informational priva-
cy—that broad protections of informational privacy are relegated to 
dicta and dissent.  However, in United States v. Jones,65 five members of 
the Court expressed their concern over the privacy implications of 
long-term GPS monitoring of a suspect’s vehicle without a warrant.66  
The Court unanimously held that the tracking in that case was an un-
constitutional search under the Fourth Amendment, but the majori-
ty’s decision rested on the pre-Katz theory that any trespass followed 
by a gathering of information qualifies as a search.67  Recognizing that 
the same level of private information could be gathered without such 
a trespass—for instance, by electronically activating GPS tracking de-
vices already installed on an individual’s car or smart phone—five 
members of the Court thought that this reasoning was insufficiently 
protective of individual privacy.68 
 
 61 Id. at 759–60. 
 62 Id. at 763. 
 63 Id. at 762. 
 64 Id. at 763. 
 65 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 66 Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 67 Id. at 950 n.3 (“Where, as here, the Government obtains information by physically intrud-
ing on a constitutionally protected area, such a search has undoubtedly occurred.”).  In 
this case, the police trespassed upon the suspect’s vehicle in order to attach the tracking 
device.  Id. at 952. 
 68 Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 961–62 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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Justice Sonia Sotomayor voiced these concerns most clearly, not-
ing the “indisputably private” information that can be gleaned from 
long-term GPS tracking.69  Visits to abortion clinics, psychiatrists, 
places of worship, gay bars, by-the-hour motels, and so on reveal not 
just the person’s movements but information regarding the “funda-
mental” spheres protected by the decisional privacy lines of cases, and 
much else that most people would consider private.  By storing that 
information, combining it with other sources, and mining it poten-
tially years later, the government could deduce even more infor-
mation with relative ease.70  Justice Sotomayor recognized that this 
level of government observation has the potential to “chill[] associa-
tional and expressive freedoms.”71  Although she concurred with the 
majority opinion that the trespass theory of search was sufficient to 
decide the case at bar, she agreed with the four other concurring Jus-
tices that there should be more comprehensive privacy protections 
against collection of this kind of information under the “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” formulation of Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence.72  There are, therefore, five Justices on today’s Supreme Court 
who seem to recognize the value of informational privacy.  But they 
have provided little guidance to the lower courts regarding how to 
protect that value. 
B.  The Debate in the States:  It Protects Something, But What and How? 
The Supreme Court has left many unanswered questions.  It has 
not decided whether a right to informational privacy exists; it has not 
decided what might constitute an infringement upon such a right; 
and it has not decided what level of scrutiny might be applied to such 
an infringement.  Therefore, the lower courts have each gone their 
separate ways.  Some courts have followed Justice Potter Stewart’s 
concurrence in Whalen, Justice Antonin Scalia’s in NASA, and the ma-
jority opinion in Paul v. Davis, finding a restricted or nonexistent 
right.73  Others have created a broader sphere of protection, from 
 
 69 Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting New York v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 
1199 (2009)). 
 70 Id. at 956. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. at 956–57; id. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 73 See, e.g., Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. v. HUD, 118 F.3d 786, 788 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (doubting 
the existence of a general right to privacy, but declining to settle the question where 
background checks asking financial questions without risk of further disclosure would not 
be a violation); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that a right to 
nondisclosure of psychological evaluations was not clearly established, and if it were, 
there was insufficient guidance on how to balance competing interests for this to be a vio-
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medical information to anything with a legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy, but nevertheless disagree on the level of scrutiny to be applied 
when a right is infringed.74  The majority, however, have ruled in favor 
of a relatively broad right and some form of heightened scrutiny.75 
The courts that refuse to find a constitutional right protecting in-
formational privacy typically express two lines of reasoning.  The first 
is that no such right has any support in the text of the Constitution, 
and it is inappropriate to create that right judicially.76  The second is 
that an informational privacy right would be implicated in nearly eve-
 
lation); Alexander v. Peffer, 993 F.2d 1348, 1350 (8th Cir. 1983) (“Therefore, we hold 
that to violate Appellant’s constitutional right of privacy the information disclosed must 
be either a shocking degradation or an egregious humiliation . . . or a flagrant breach of 
a pledge of confidentiality which was instrumental in obtaining the personal infor-
mation.”); J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1089–90 (6th Cir. 1981) (refusing to find a gen-
eral constitutional right to nondisclosure except where fundamental liberties are in-
fringed). 
 74 See, e.g., Coffman v. Indianapolis Fire Dep’t, 578 F.3d 559, 566 (7th Cir. 2009) (acknowl-
edging that a right to confidentiality of medical records exists, but declining to establish 
an appropriate level of scrutiny where the state’s interests were compelling); Donohue v. 
Hoey, 109 F. App’x 340, 360–61 (10th Cir. 2004) (finding a protected privacy right to 
nondisclosure where there is a legitimate expectation of privacy that may be infringed on-
ly in the least intrusive means necessary to advance a compelling state interest); Tucson 
Women’s Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 551 (9th Cir. 2004) (applying a balancing test re-
garding informational privacy that considers five factors:  the type of information, the po-
tential harm of disclosure, the adequacy of safeguards against unwarranted disclosure, 
the need for access, and the existence of a statutory mandate or public policy interest); 
James v. City of Douglas, 941 F.2d 1539, 1541, 1544 (11th Cir. 1991) (finding that a clear-
ly established right to nondisclosure of private information was violated by police officers 
who viewed a tape of the plaintiff’s sexual relations); Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 
188, 192 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that a right to informational privacy protects any in-
formation to which the individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy and can only be 
overridden by a compelling interest); Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d 1554, 1560–62 
(2d Cir. 1983) (applying intermediate scrutiny to the forced disclosure of financial in-
formation by public employees and finding an important interest in preventing conflicts 
of interest sufficient to justify disclosure and even public review after an ethics board de-
termination that either the information was not private or it pertained to the employee’s 
work or potential conflicts of interest); Fadjo v. Coon, 633 F.2d 1172, 1174–75 (5th Cir. 
1981) (holding that disclosure of unelaborated private details by the government to an 
insurance investigator gave rise to a cognizable claim of a constitutional violation and 
remanding the case with instructions to balance the invasion of privacy against any legit-
imate state purpose sufficiently important to outweigh the violation); United States v. 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577–78 (3d Cir. 1980) (finding medical records 
to be entitled to constitutional protection but subject to a balancing test). 
 75 On a simple count of the circuits, nine have found a right to informational privacy that 
extends beyond interferences with fundamental rights with at least a balancing test, while 
three have not.  See supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text. 
 76 See, e.g., NASA v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 769 (2011) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“No provi-
sion in the Constitution mentions such a right.”); DeSanti, 653 F.2d at 1090 (“Inferring 
very broad ‘constitutional’ rights where the Constitution itself does not express them is an 
activity not appropriate to the judiciary.”). 
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ry action of the government.  Forcing the government to justify intru-
sions and asking the courts to hear those justifications would be a 
burden too great to bear:  the courts can hear only so many cases, 
and every minute a government agent spends defending his actions 
in court is a minute spent not performing his other duties.77  The 
perceived danger is that creating so broad a right would force courts 
to provide limited protection against individual infringements.78  
Greater scrutiny means that statutes must be more narrowly tailored 
and government actions must have greater countervailing interests 
before they are justified, potentially forcing the government to use 
less efficient means to accomplish its goals.  Demanding narrower tai-
loring and greater justifications may be particularly difficult when the 
judicial branch has so little textual support for making such burden-
some demands. 
Those courts that have accepted a broad right have typically simp-
ly cited Whalen and the Supreme Court’s other privacy decisions and 
announced tests.79  The tests may reflect what Mary D. Fan refers to as 
the “creepiness emotional meter.”80  The gist of this concept is that 
there is an intuitive sense that the government should not be able to 
demand or divulge private information without good reason.81  Cer-
tain actions taken by government officials or legislatures can and do 
step beyond the pale, so there must be some constitutional protec-
tions when they do.82  The idea that a sex tape taken as evidence of 
extortion could be passed around the precinct for the viewing pleas-
ure of the officers,83 or that humiliating details of a rape—details that 
 
 77 See, e.g., NASA, 131 S. Ct. at 769 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“It will dramatically increase the 
number of lawsuits claiming violations of the right to informational privacy.”); DeSanti, 
653 F.2d at 1090 (“The Framers rejected a provision in the Constitution under which the 
Supreme Court would have reviewed all legislation for its constitutionality.  They cannot 
have intended that the federal courts become involved in an inquiry nearly as broad—
balancing almost every act of government, both state and federal, against its intrusion on 
a concept so vague, undefinable, and all-encompassing as individual privacy.”). 
 78 DeSanti, 653 F.2d at 1090 (“Courts called upon to balance virtually every government ac-
tion against the corresponding intrusion on individual privacy may be able to give all pri-
vacy interests only cursory protection.”). 
 79 See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d at 570, 576–79 (citing no constitutional provi-
sions as a source of the right, yet accepting that, after Whalen, it extends to informational 
privacy). 
 80 Mary D. Fan, Constitutionalizing Informational Privacy by Assumption, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
953, 956 (2012). 
 81 Id. at 978–80. 
 82 Id. at 956–57 (providing examples of shocking violations of the hypothetical right to pri-
vacy that have driven courts to recognize the hypothetical right over arguments of quali-
fied immunity). 
 83 James v. City of Douglas, 941 F.2d 1539, 1540–41 (11th Cir. 1991) (finding a violation of 
the right to informational privacy on these facts). 
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the victim had not even told her husband—could be released at a 
press conference without public purpose,84 is so viscerally horrifying 
to the courts that it seems intuitively impossible that no constitutional 
right exists to prevent such behavior.85 
1. Existing Protections Are Not Sufficient 
The urgency of this intuitive need for protection is reinforced by 
the fact that state law remedies do not cover the full range of privacy 
issues, not even in the cases of government executive action.86  Defa-
mation claims may only be leveled when disclosed information is 
false:  not when the information is true, not when the government 
collects private information without disclosing it, and not when the 
First Amendment is implicated and no malice is shown.87  In most 
states, an action exists for publication of a private fact, but only if 
there has been disclosure of “highly offensive” matters to a wide au-
dience:  not when the disclosure is merely private but not highly of-
fensive, or when the audience is a small but important group such as 
a person’s spouse, parents, or employer.88  Nor does it exist in the 
fourteen states that do not have this cause of action.89  Finally, there is 
a remedy for intentional infliction of emotional distress, but this 
reaches only the most “extreme and outrageous” disclosures, and 
even then, only when the disclosure is at least reckless.90  Thus, a case 
in which a police officer needlessly discloses a person’s HIV status, 
causing that person’s entire family to be ostracized, would likely not 
be cognizable under any state law remedy because the information 
was true, disclosed only to a small audience—who later told the 
press—and likely not outrageous enough to be intentional infliction 
 
 84 Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 676, 686 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding a violation of an informa-
tional privacy right under those facts, even though the Sixth Circuit does not recognize a 
general right). 
 85 Fan, supra note 80, at 956–57 (citing James and Bloch as examples of cases that were so 
outrageous and horrifying that courts were driven to recognize a constitutional right to 
privacy even though the Supreme Court had not yet recognized one). 
 86 Martin, supra note 6, at 441–42. 
 87 Id. (outlining the types of violations of privacy rights that cannot be successfully present-
ed in defamation actions even though they intuitively should be). 
 88 Id. at 442 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977)). 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. at 443.  Recklessness requires that the defendant be aware of a substantial risk that his 
behavior will cause the prohibited result—in this case, emotional distress.  E.g. MODEL 
PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1985) (“A person acts recklessly with respect to a material ele-
ment of an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that 
the material element exists or will result from his conduct.”). 
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of emotional distress.91  Similarly, a case in which a boy commits sui-
cide after the police threaten to tell his grandfather that he is a ho-
mosexual would be unlikely to fall under any of these state law torts.92 
There is some question whether the gaps left by this patchwork of 
state law privacy protections should be closed.  Ingrid Schüpbach Mar-
tin argues that they should not be closed because the law should favor 
free dissemination of information over privacy.93  In other words, she 
believes that society would be a better place if everyone came out of 
the closet and had a frank discussion about their lifestyle.  She wor-
ries that allowing someone to sue for disclosure of their sexual orien-
tation officially acknowledges that that status is shameful and embar-
rassing.94  Martin may be right that society would be a better place if 
everyone came out of the closet.  But to force individuals to disclose 
their sexual identity for our own betterment—to force them to sacri-
fice their privacy and suffer the real if unfortunate costs that might 
attend that sacrifice—may ask too much. 
Martin further argues that closing the gaps left by state tort law 
and allowing challenges to potentially unconstitutional lawmaking 
could produce excessive litigation against government agents that 
impede their efficiency.95  The thought that closing the gaps would 
produce substantially more cases than have already been dealt with 
over the last three decades hardly seems plausible, however.  In the 
majority of circuits, the courts have accepted some level of protection 
for informational privacy rights already and must hear cases on these 
issues even where those protections are limited to “fundamental” 
rights protected by the decisional line of privacy.96  There may even 
be less litigation when clear standards deter frivolous suits and a rec-
ognized, defined right reduces the incidence of violation.  While such 
a right may cause a police officer to pause and consider whether dis-
closure of a particular piece of information collected in his or her in-
vestigation implicates a privacy right, the potential harm to the fact-
finding process can be minimized by an appropriately deferential 
 
 91 See Doe v. Borough of Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 376, 385 (D.N.J. 1990) (finding a violation 
of the victim’s constitutional right to informational privacy in a case with those facts). 
 92 See Sterling v. Borough of Minersville, 232 F.3d 190, 197 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding a viola-
tion of the victim’s right to informational privacy in a case with those facts). 
 93 Martin, supra note 6, at 443–44. 
 94 Id. at 444 (arguing that creating a cause of action for disclosures of truthful information 
such as race, gender, or sexual orientation implies that such information is harmful). 
 95 Id. (arguing that public officials may become “overly cautious or confused” when trying to 
meet the law’s requirements and avoid lawsuits). 
 96 See supra notes 73–74 (citing cases that are examples of standards used to determine when 
disclosures of information rise to the level of constitutional violations). 
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level of scrutiny, and the mitigating benefits to privacy rights may be 
worthwhile. 
2. The Argument for a Judicial Solution 
Even if we accept that these holes should be filled, it would not 
necessarily be clear that the federal judiciary should be the one to fill 
them.  The most obvious problem is one of democratic legitimacy:  if 
there is no constitutional basis for the right, then the federal courts 
have no authority to impose a remedy.  This may be why the Court 
has been so reluctant to make a definitive decision on the existence 
of a right.  To step forward and acknowledge a right would be to risk 
judicial overreach, yet, at the same time, to step back would be to re-
verse three decades of jurisprudence in the lower courts and deny a 
right that may be desirable to protect.97 
Another problem with common law privacy protections is that, 
developing on a case-by-case basis, they would be less transparent and 
coherent than a comprehensive legislative effort.98  This is particularly 
true when there is no clear principle guiding the decisions as to what 
should be protected and what should be sufficient justification.99  
Without guiding principles, judges are left to their own value judg-
ments rather than uniform philosophical principles or democratically 
agreed-upon consensus.  Furthermore, there is little basis on which to 
predict what activity will be deemed a violation until after a court has 
decided, leaving little guidance ex ante as to when an action should 
not be taken, when a right needs vindicating, and when a suit is frivo-
lous.100  These critiques apply with equal force to the current state of 
affairs, however, where the Supreme Court hypothesizes about a right 
to informational privacy while the lower courts continue to feel their 
way in the dark towards disparate ends.101  It is therefore not a reason 
for the Court to maintain its current course. 
While the legislature may have more democratic legitimacy and 
greater ex ante perspective from which to develop a cohesive frame-
 
 97 Crumbo, supra note 14, at 434–35. 
 98 See Martin, supra note 6, at 445 (arguing that the legislative process is a superior one for 
settling these kinds of questions). 
 99 See Fan, supra note 80, at 958 (arguing that the unprincipled application of the protection 
allows status quo biases to sneak in and deter innovation). 
100 See NASA v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 768–69 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting five 
factors on which a case could differ from NASA that might allow it to prevail, with no 
guidance from the majority on which, if any, of those factors are important and how 
much difference would be sufficient to change the result). 
101 See Fan, supra note 80, at 979 (“In the absence of law and defined standards, a constitu-
tional jurisprudence of intuitions has arisen in the lower courts.”). 
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work, leaving the decisions on privacy rights to the political process as 
opposed to the judiciary is problematic from another perspective.  
One of the primary purposes of a constitution is to prevent the will of 
the majority from oppressing the minority—why else constrain the 
power of a democratically elected legislature?102  There is admittedly 
no clear minority group disfavored by a lack of privacy protections.  
There are undoubtedly some kinds of information each of us may 
consider worth protecting, and the legislatures may eventually re-
spond to that desire. 
However, legislative action is not always effective at protecting dis-
favored minority groups.103  The majority may wish to oust these out-
siders, or it may simply lack the motivation to overcome the inertia of 
the legislative process.  For instance, it might be easier to pass a law 
that allowed the government to collect information about immi-
grants—ostensibly because they are more likely to be terrorists or 
drug runners—than to pass a law that protects homosexuals from dis-
closure of their sexual orientations.  The right to privacy is funda-
mentally a minority protection, allowing a sphere of autonomous de-
cision-making and freedom from the fear of the majority’s ridicule of 
one’s personal choices.  To lay the burden of protecting this right at 
the feet of the majority suffers from the same problems as asking the 
majority to decide whether one might engage in consensual homo-
sexual relations or join the communist party.104  Recognition by the 
 
102 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:  A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 102–03 
(1980) (arguing that judges can legitimately intervene and overrule the democratic pro-
cess when that process is “malfunctioning”); id. at 103 (“Malfunction occurs . . . when (1) 
the ins are choking off the channels of political change to ensure that they will stay in and 
the outs will stay out, or (2) though no one is actually denied a voice or a vote, represent-
atives beholden to an effective majority are systematically disadvantaging some minority 
out of simple hostility or a prejudiced refusal to recognize commonalities of interest, and 
thereby denying that minority the protection afforded other groups by a representative 
system.”). 
103 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938) (acknowledging 
the possibility that “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special 
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordi-
narily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly 
more searching judicial inquiry”); Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and 
the Theory of Public Choice; Or, Why Don’t Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the Ac-
cused?, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079, 1079–80 (1993) (applying public choice theory to show 
that legislatures’ incentives to protect the rights of disfavored minorities are minimal or 
contrary and that the courts must step in to protect fundamental liberties). 
104 While minority interests in privacy may be particularly in need of judicial intervention, 
that protection may be most effective if it comes in the form of a broad rule that defends 
the majority as well.  Safeguards specifically for minorities like HIV patients can create 
practical difficulties and resentment towards the singled-out minority.  See Hannah Fish-
man, HIV Confidentiality and Stigma:  A Way Forward, 16 U. PENN. J. CONST. L. 191, 215 
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courts that informational privacy is an important right with constitu-
tional dimensions could help ensure that the courts will scrutinize 
such infringements, whether affirmatively enacted by the legislature 
or committed by the executive in the absence of legislative protec-
tions.  The idea that so important a right can exist on so shaky a 
ground–or indeed not exist at all—is fundamentally problematic. 
In addition, these gaps in legislative protections for the right to 
privacy have persisted for a very long time, and it is not altogether 
clear that the gears are turning to close them now.105  Even if legisla-
tive clarity is preferable to judicial clarity, one clear answer from the 
Supreme Court is preferable to twelve vague ones from the circuits. 
The current uncertainty has several detrimental effects.  First, in-
sofar as there is a “correct” answer to the question, a circuit split im-
plies that one side or the other is “incorrect.”  Either constitutional 
rights are being underenforced in jurisdictions that improperly nar-
row the right, or nonexistent rights are being enforced in jurisdic-
tions that improperly broaden it. 
Second, this assumed, but unconfirmed, right leaves the lower 
courts, government actors, and potential claimants with little guid-
ance.  As Justice Scalia suggested in his concurrence in NASA v. Nel-
son, this encourages an endless stream of hopeful plaintiffs to flood 
the courts with claims that are different on one or another dimension 
from decided cases because they have no grounds on which to de-
termine whether those differences are relevant.106  A vague right may 
therefore result in even more litigation than a broad but clear one. 
Another possibility is that, for fear of prosecution, government 
agencies will be unwilling to cross a boundary whose location is un-
certain and will be deterred from beneficial policies that approach 
but do not step over that boundary.107  The question should be set-
tled, one way or the other, and the Supreme Court may be the only 
institution that can settle it. 
 
(2013) (“By singling out HIV as a disease in need of additional protection, legislators 
bring attention to negative perceptions about people with HIV.  Treating the HIV-positive 
community as ‘different’ reinforces the alienating stigma society already focuses on peo-
ple struggling with the disease.”). 
105 See generally, e.g., The FISA Improvements Act of 2013, available at 
http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/pdfs113th/113fisa_improvements.pdf (codifying the 
NSA practice of bulk collection of communications metadata).  The FISA Improvements 
Act was voted out of committee on Oct. 31, 2013, by a vote of 11-4.  Press Release, Dianne 
Feinstein, United States Senator for California, Senate Intelligence Committee Approves 
FISA Improvements Act (Oct. 31, 2013), http://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/
index.cfm/press-releases?ID=3aa4ed70-e80b-4c2b-afd6-dc2e5bc75a7b. 
106 NASA v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 768–69 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
107 Fan, supra note 80, at 958. 
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II.  THE STATE OF EUROPEAN LAW 
If the Court is to settle the question, it must decide how much 
protection is desirable, how much protection is feasible, and how 
much protection is acceptable within the limits of the Constitution.  
Perhaps surprisingly, we can learn much from the European experi-
ence with privacy, even on the third question of acceptability within 
the U.S. Constitution.  Although some Justices consider foreign ma-
terials to be at best irrelevant and at worst illegitimate,108 others have 
cited European precedents, particularly when seeking to gauge the 
view of the wider world on matters of human rights.109  U.S. constitu-
tional jurisprudence is not bound by the decisions of other courts or 
the texts of other constitutions, but this does not preclude us from 
“looking beyond our borders” at the logic and experience of wise ju-
rists in foreign countries.110 
European courts have long dealt with issues of informational pri-
vacy.  Their experiences can teach us both about the importance of 
the right and the practicality of enforcing it.111  Even Justice Scalia, a 
man generally against the use of foreign materials to aid interpreta-
tion of the U.S. Constitution, is willing to acknowledge that it has a 
 
108 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 624–28 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that the majority’s use of international precedents to support its argument was illegiti-
mate, particularly where it was not consistent in doing so). 
109 See, e.g., id. at 578 (Kennedy, J., majority) ( “It does not lessen our fidelity to the Constitu-
tion or our pride in its origins to acknowledge that the express affirmation of certain 
fundamental rights by other nations and peoples simply underscores the centrality of 
those same rights within our own heritage of freedom.”); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 
558, 572–73 (2003) (looking to European law in considering the constitutionality of crim-
inalizing homosexual sodomy). 
110 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Looking Beyond Our Borders:  The Value of a Comparative Perspective in 
Constitutional Adjudication, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 8–9 (2003) (applauding the Court’s in-
creasing examination of foreign law sources); see also Sandra Day O’Connor, Assoc. Jus-
tice, U.S., Keynote Address at the Ninety-Sixth Annual Meeting of the American Society 
of International Law (March 16, 2002), in 96 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 348, 350 (2002) 
(“[T]here is much to learn from other distinguished jurists who have given thought to 
the same difficult issues that we face here.”); Antonin Scalia & Stephen Breyer, The Rele-
vance of Foreign Legal Materials in U.S. Constitutional Cases:  A Conversation Between Justice An-
tonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer, 3 INT’L J. CONST. L. 519, 523–26 (2005) (arguing on 
Justice Breyer’s side that foreign jurists grapple with similar issues and may have cogent 
arguments and explanations that would be helpful to the American jurist, and on Justice 
Scalia’s side that it is irrelevant both to what the Framers meant and to what modern 
American society thinks the Constitution should mean). 
111 See Scalia & Breyer, supra note 110, at 526, 537 (arguing on Justice Scalia’s side that for-
eign law can be cited to show that “the sky will not fall” if a similar interpretation is taken, 
and on Justice Breyer’s side that it could be cited to show that a “particular interpretation 
of similar language in a similar document had had an adverse effect on free expression”). 
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place as evidence of the consequences of a possible decision.112  And 
just as in Lawrence v. Texas, the importance and universality of the 
right in Europe may also be evidence of its fundamentality in the 
United States.113 
In Europe, the right to privacy is firmly grounded in Article Eight 
of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms: 
Article 8—Right to respect for the private and family life 
(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his 
home and his correspondence. 
(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise 
of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary 
in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety 
or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder 
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of 
the rights and freedoms of others. 114 
This right is directly enforceable in the ECtHR.115  Not only does the 
European privacy right have more textual support than the U.S. pri-
vacy right considered in Whalen and NASA, but it is broader and 
deeper, protecting more information from less serious invasions. 
One area of broader coverage involves the storage of private data.  
In contrast to Whalen, where the Court focused on the protections 
against public disclosure and did not even clearly require a balancing 
test when the data were merely collected and stored,116 the ECtHR has 
long held that the act of storing private data alone implicated Article 
8.117  In Leander v. Sweden, the ECtHR considered that Article 8 was 
implicated by the collection of information about the plaintiff in a 
secret police-register to which he did not have access, but which 
 
112 Id. at 526 (“Of course, you can cite foreign law to show—Justice Breyer gave an exam-
ple—to show that if the Court adopts this particular view of the Constitution, the sky will 
not fall.”). 
113 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573 (considering that the protections for homosexuals embodied 
in the European Convention on Human Rights show that “our Western Civilization” con-
siders those rights to be substantial). 
114 CPHR, supra note 8, at art. 8. 
115 Id. at art. 34 (“The Court may receive applications from any person, non-governmental 
organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the 
High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the protocols there-
to.”). 
116 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 600–04 (1977). 
117 See, e.g., Leander v. Sweden, App. No. 9248/81, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 18 (1987), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57519 (finding that Arti-
cle 8 rights were implicated by the storage of a secret police file on the plaintiff, coupled 
with a refusal to allow him to review and rebut its contents). 
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caused him to lose a potential job on a naval base.118  Similarly, in S. 
& Marper v. United Kingdom, the court considered that “the mere stor-
ing of data relating to the private life of an individual amounts to an 
interference within the meaning of Article 8.”119 
The decision in Leander also illustrates the greater depth of pro-
tection afforded to privacy in Europe.  Although the court deemed 
the interference excused, it applied a three-part test under paragraph 
two requiring any infringement (a) be in pursuit of a legitimate in-
terest (here, national security); (b) be “in accordance with the law”; 
and (c) be “necessary in a democratic society.”120 
The requirement that the interference be in accordance with the 
law is broader than it would appear on its face, demanding not just 
statutory authority but notice and foreseeability to the individual of 
the sorts actions that might be taken.121  Thus, the Court went beyond 
the text to ensure that citizens would be forewarned—at least con-
structively—that their information might be collected or disclosed 
before they act in a way that they would not want revealed or that 
might trigger such disclosure. 
The necessity requirement was glossed with a “margin of apprecia-
tion,” demanding only that there be proportionality between the le-
gitimate aim and the infringement and safeguards against abuse in-
stead of a more literal interpretation that would allow sovereigns to 
infringe only when there was no alternative.122  However, in Marper, 
the court found that a blanket policy of indefinite retention of DNA 
and fingerprints in a police database—even when only trained pro-
fessionals with special equipment could access it—was disproportion-
ate insofar as it applied equally to those acquitted or convicted of 
both large and small crimes.123 
The protected sphere is also larger under European jurispru-
dence than under U.S. informational privacy doctrine.  Article 8 pro-
tects the usual spheres of private information such as sexuality and 
medical records just as in the United States.124  However, the ECtHR, 
 
118 Id. at 4–5. 
119 S. & Marper v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 30562/04 and 30566/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 20–
21 (2008) (considering that DNA and fingerprints collected by the police following an ar-
rest implicated Article 8 rights) (internal citation omitted). 
120 Leander, App. No. 9248/81, Eur. Ct. H.R., at 18–21. 
121 Id. at 19–20. 
122 Id. at 21. 
123 Marper, App. Nos. 30562/04 and 30566/04 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 207–09. 
124 See, e.g., Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom, App. No. 28957/95 Eur. Ct. H.R. 21–22 
(2002)(holding that the United Kingdom was obligated to make certain changes to the 
legal treatment of transsexuals, inter alia, to facilitate keeping their prior gender secret 
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in Niemietz v. Germany, found a violation of Article 8 even in the 
search of a lawyer’s offices, conducted with a warrant.125  It considered 
that a person develops relationships in his work life that are included 
within his private life, and therefore, his place of work must be in-
cluded in the protected private sphere irrespective of the word 
“home” in the text of the convention.126  Therefore, the search and 
the warrant authorizing it were too broad to pass the “necessary” re-
quirement, and the court found a violation.127 
Perhaps the biggest difference in the protection provided by Arti-
cle 8 relative to U.S. privacy rights is that Article 8 applies to private 
individuals, not just state action.  In the United Kingdom, for in-
stance, the House of Lords has held that “the values enshrined in ar-
ticles 8 and 10 are now part of the cause of action for breach of con-
fidence.”128  Internalization of those values allowed the courts to 
extend the breach of confidence action to situations where no formal 
relationship of confidentiality actually existed, but where the confi-
dante ought to know that information he has received is “confiden-
tial,” and to extend the privileges of confidentiality to information 
that implicates privacy even when it strains the use of the word.129  For 
example, in Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers, the House of 
Lords extended a duty of confidence not just to a former MI-5 agent 
not to disclose confidential information that came to him in that ca-
pacity, but to the publishers who circulated that information knowing 
that to do so was a breach of the agent’s duty.130 
Campbell v. Mirror Group Newspapers extended this further to allow 
an action against the newspaper for publishing a story about a famous 
fashion model’s struggles with drug addiction, including a photo-
graph of her leaving a Narcotics Anonymous meeting.131  The picture 
was taken in a public street and was in no way embarrassing; never-
theless, its publication was found to have infringed her privacy in a 
 
from employers); Z v. Finland, App. No. 22009/93, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1,  16–22 (1998) (hold-
ing that disclosure of medical records and HIV status implicated Article 8, and that while 
it was justified with respect to applicant’s husband’s state of mind in a rape prosecution, it 
was not justified as to the applicant herself; nor was a ten-year limit on the records’ confi-
dentiality). 
125 Niemietz v. Germany, App. No. 13710/88, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 12 (1993). 
126 Id. at 10–12; CPHR, supra note 8, at art. 8. 
127 Niemietz, App. No. 13710/88 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 12. 
128 Campbell v. Mirror Grp. Newspapers, [2004] 2 A.C. 457 (H.L.) 465 (appeal taken from 
U.K.). 
129 Id. at 465–66. 
130 Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers, [1990] 1 A.C. 109 (H.L.) 284 (appeal taken 
from U.K.). 
131 Campbell, 2 A.C. at 500–02. 
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way that was not justified by any public interest in exposing her false 
claims regarding her past drug use.  On the other hand, the plaintiff 
did not challenge publication of the bare fact of her drug problem, 
so it is possible—perhaps even probable—that such a publication 
would have been considered justified.132  Regardless, the United 
Kingdom applies a constitutional form of privacy right even to private 
actors in order to ensure maximum protection. 
III.  LESSONS FROM ACROSS THE POND 
A.  Broader Protections Are Feasible 
There are two primary lessons to draw from European jurispru-
dence on the right to privacy.  The first is that a broader right is fea-
sible.  The United Kingdom is an illustrative test case.  Like the Unit-
ed States, the United Kingdom did not initially (and arguably still 
does not) have a constitutional right to action for invasion of priva-
cy.133  Instead, it had common law torts such as breach of confidence, 
with gaps if invasions were not intentional and where no relationship 
existed between the confider and the confidante.134  Subsequently, 
when Article 8 came into effect and was eventually implemented 
through the U.K. Human Rights Act of 1998, it substantially closed 
those gaps.135 
Today, U.K. courts will hear cases for invasions of privacy by both 
private and public actors whenever the claimant possesses a “reason-
able expectation of privacy” in information that is disclosed or even 
 
132 See id. at 457 (“She accepted that the newspaper was entitled to publish the fact of her 
drug addiction and the bare fact that she was receiving treatment . . . .”). 
133 Basil Markesinis et al., Concern and Ideas About the Developing English Law of Privacy (And 
How Knowledge of Foreign Law Might Be of Help), 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 133, 134–36 (2004) (de-
scribing how the United Kingdom has expanded old privacy torts to fill the gaps in com-
mon law privacy protections and arguing for the development of a new, independent tort 
of privacy); Cheng Lim Saw & Gary Chan, The House of Lords at the Crossroads of Privacy and 
Confidence, 35 HONG KONG L.J. 91, 99 (2005) (“English courts are not yet ready to recog-
nize a general and comprehensive tort of invasion of privacy and prefer instead to safe-
guard the individual’s informational autonomy through a modern interpretation of the 
long-established action for breach of confidence.”).  While the United Kingdom does not 
have a formal written constitution the way the United States does, constitutional princi-
ples like democracy and human rights operate on an informal level, in this case, encour-
aging U.K. judges to expand existing torts to better protect privacy. 
134 Guardian Newspapers, 1 A.C. at 281. 
135 See Markesinis, supra note 133, at 133–34 (acknowledging expansion of privacy protec-
tions, but arguing that stretching old causes of action to fill the gaps leads to inadequate 
protection and doctrinal confusion). 
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stored.136  Apart from some opposition from the press to the “celebrity 
privacy” line of cases (a line which would of course be impossible to 
follow in the United States due to the state action doctrine)137 there is 
little indication of a desire to turn back.138  Add this to the fact that 
nine of twelve circuits have been protecting a broad right in the 
United States for three decades without the sky falling, and the ar-
gument already made in Part I.B that a clearer doctrine might actual-
ly reduce litigation even if the right were broadened and strength-
ened, and it would seem that fairly broad protections are feasible. 
B.  Broader Protections Are Desirable 
The European situation also demonstrates why broader protec-
tions are desirable.  The differences in privacy protection between 
the United States and Europe can be traced to a somewhat differing 
conception of the right to privacy.  In the United States, privacy is a 
right against the government, a right to prevent the state from inter-
fering in personal decisions—including the decision not to disclose 
certain information.139  The focus of informational privacy, however, 
is limited to protecting citizens from harms that may result from the 
disclosure of certain kinds of information:  extreme embarrassment 
that may result from disclosure of sexual habits or medical data, or 
risks to safety from disclosure of identifying information.140  In Eu-
 
136 See Mosley v. News Grp. Newspapers, [2008] EWHC 1777, (7) Q.B. (“The law now affords 
protection to information in respect of which there is a reasonable expectation of priva-
cy . . . .”); S. & Marper v. United Kingdom, App. No. 30562/04 and 30566/04, Eur. Ct. 
H.R. 208–09 (2008) (finding a violation for storage of DNA and fingerprints). 
137 See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) (holding that the Constitution regulates 
only the actions of states and cannot even be used as a source of authority for Congress to 
regulate the actions of private individuals). 
138 See Markesinis, supra note 135, at 153 (calling for further expansion of English privacy law 
over the “welcome developments” thus far); Saw & Chan, supra note 133 (“There is hope 
that the courts are now taking informational privacy more seriously.”).  Consider also the 
continued expansion of the U.K. privacy right between Guardian Newspapers, 1 A.C. at 109, 
Campbell v. Mirror Grp. Newspapers, (2004) 2 A.C. 457 (appeal taken from U.K.), and 
Mosley, EWHC 1777.  Given that extension of privacy rights to protect against private ac-
tors is likely impossible in the United States and certainly beyond the scope of this paper, 
opposition of newspapers to that extension is irrelevant.  See supra note 137. 
139 See Fan, supra note 80, at 959 (arguing that privacy rights are a tool to allow the judiciary 
to regulate the balance of power between individuals and the state). 
140 Compare Sterling v. Borough of Minersville, 232 F.3d 190, 194–97 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding 
a violation of the right to informational privacy in disclosure of sexual orientation, even 
when homosexual sodomy could still be constitutionally criminalized), with J.P. v. De-
Santi, 653 F.2d 1080, 1082, 1088 (6th Cir. 1981) (finding no violation in the disclosure of 
“social histories” of juvenile defendants including information from school records, court 
records, family members, and “any other information that the probation officer thinks is 
relevant to the disposition of a case” without consent of the defendant). 
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rope, privacy is a right to personality—“a right to be rather than a 
right to be left alone.”141  It is not just a freedom to choose without in-
terference from the state; it is the recognition that the mere possibil-
ity that our choices may be recorded and publicized affects those 
choices and interferes with our ability to autonomously construct our 
identities—both the private lives we live for ourselves and the per-
sonas we show the world.142 
Professor James Whitman explains the differing conceptions of 
privacy in the United States and Europe as the result of different em-
phases:  “liberty” in the United States versus “dignity” in Europe.143  
Thus, Americans demand a sphere into which the government may 
not enter—the home—and insist upon exclusion of illegally seized 
evidence and freedom from government interference in their choice 
of baby names.144  On the other hand, they are quite willing to allow 
private actors to delve into their credit history or even more personal 
information through civil discovery mechanisms, and outside the 
home, they have few qualms about arresting people for choosing to 
sunbathe topless or about allowing the state to search their workplac-
es.145  In contrast, Europeans focus on the right to control one’s pub-
lic image—“rights to guarantee that people see you the way you want 
to be seen”—through controlling the information that is disclosed.146  
Europeans therefore care far less whether the intruder is a state or 
private actor, or whether the intrusion occurs in the home or at work.  
They are willing to allow the state to veto the name they decide to 
give their children, or to tap their phones tens or even hundreds of 
times more frequently than the U.S. Government does, because these 
things have little to do with their public image.  But they are not will-
ing to allow even private actors like newspapers, civil litigants, or 
would-be creditors to intrude on their privacy even in the work-
place.147 
This stark difference in viewpoint requires a different kind of pro-
tection.  For “liberty,” individuals need only for the government to 
stay away, but for “dignity,” they require affirmative protection from 
the intrusions of others.  This distinction is similar to Isaiah Berlin’s 
 
141 Lemmens, supra note 11, at 384. 
142 See id. at 383 (“[P]rotection of privacy enables us to present and to control a ‘we’ that we 
ourselves create.”). 
143 James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy:  Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 
1151, 1160–62 (2004). 
144 Id. at 1159, 1161–62. 
145 Id. at 1156, 1158. 
146 Id. at 1161. 
147 Id. at 1156–59. 
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ideas of positive and negative liberty.148  The U.S. idea of privacy is a 
“negative” liberty, a freedom from interference by the government, 
while the European conception is positive, a freedom to choose for 
oneself rather than allow others to dictate what personal information 
will be disclosed.149  The European system creates a kind of legal claim 
that lets an individual call upon the force of the state to aid him in 
enforcing his right to choose.150  This expands his options to include 
choices he could not have selected without state backing.  It may be 
seen as restricting the option of others to infringe upon each other’s 
privacy rights.  However, when a balancing test is employed, net social 
utility necessarily increases (at least on the assumption that the court 
gets the balance right).151 
The difference between the United States and European systems 
is a difference not just in degree but in kind:  the European right is 
broader because its goal is to facilitate an individual’s ability to mold 
a persona to his or her own specifications, not merely to prevent the 
government from molding it.152  It also reflects a difference in the im-
portance placed on the right.  European courts are willing to wade 
into suits between private individuals to ensure the maximum scope 
of the privacy sphere.  U.S. courts, on the other hand, are reluctant to 
allow even suits against the abuses of government agents wielding 
government authority.153  The U.K. courts have refused to presume 
that privacy rights are any less worthy of protection than freedom of 
expression, long hallowed in U.S. jurisprudence.154  The question, 
then, is which side has the better answer? 
The Supreme Court has long recognized the importance of priva-
cy rights, even if it has not yet held that privacy extends beyond the 
decisional sphere.155  What the Court must acknowledge is that priva-
 
148 Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in LIBERTY:  ISAIAH BERLIN 166 (Henry Hardy ed., 
2002). 
149 See id. at 169, 178 (defining negative and positive liberty). 
150 See Lemmens, supra note 11, at 390 (describing personality rights as “similar to rights in 
rem,” but expressing uneasiness with the lack of clearly demarcated “res”). 
151 See Campbell v. Mirror Grp. Newspapers, [2004] 2 A.C. 457 (H.L.) 474 (arguing that 
when freedom of the press is curtailed only where there is a countervailing privacy inter-
est and when privacy interests are curtailed only when there is a countervailing public in-
terest in disclosure, then there is often no conflict, and the stronger interest will prevail 
when there is). 
152 See Lemmens, supra note 11, at 384 (describing both a “defensive right” against “unwant-
ed intrusions” and an “offensive” one facilitating an “aspiration of autonomy”). 
153 See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976) (refusing to “make of the Fourteenth 
Amendment a font of tort law”). 
154 See Campbell, 2 A.C. at 464. 
155 See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (“If the right of privacy means anything, 
it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted govern-
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cy is as easily trammeled by social pressures—and indeed by the fear 
of potential social pressure—as it is by government intrusion.  When 
the government collects information in a way that makes us change 
our decision-making, it has interfered with that decision-making as 
surely as if it had made the decision for us.  When it divulges infor-
mation that we would rather keep secret, social stigma and pressure 
to conform interfere with both our decision-making and our right to 
structure our relationships as we see fit.156  At the very least, then, con-
stitutional protections must exist when information collection and 
disclosure implicate the fundamental freedoms of the decisional 
sphere of privacy.  Informational privacy, like decisional privacy, is a 
liberty interest as much as a privacy interest.157  It would be very useful 
to make these constitutional protections sufficiently clear that gov-
ernment actors can predict when they have crossed the line into pro-
tected freedoms and be called to account for doing so. 
But more than that, if the goal of autonomous decision-making 
can be recognized as more than simply keeping the government out 
of one’s backyard, then limiting the right to informational privacy to 
issues of family, sexuality, and child-rearing simply is not enough.  
The greater the range of information that might be collected and 
disclosed by the government without warning or justification, the 
lesser the range in which people are truly free to decide for them-
selves—to be themselves—without fear of opprobrium, be it expressed 
actively or passively, by government or by society.  Where a legitimate 
expectation of privacy is not fulfilled and private information is col-
lected or disclosed, individuals’ ability to construct their personae 
and social connections—to live their lives autonomously—is dam-
aged.  The United States and Europe may have different conceptions 
of privacy, but the interest in constructing our public face is as im-
portant to our liberty as it is to our dignity.  Privacy protects our abil-
ity to act without embarrassment, not just our ability to avoid being 
embarrassed. 
The law should therefore protect confidentiality of information to 
the full extent of legitimate expectations and abrogate those protec-
tions only when a public interest at least as strong counterbalances 
 
mental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision wheth-
er to bear or beget a child.”); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (finding 
a zone of privacy created by penumbras and emanations of enumerated rights). 
156 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572–74 (2003) (finding that a constitutional right to 
structure private relationships was infringed by a law against homosexual sodomy). 
157 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (relying on “liberty” 
rather than Roe’s “privacy” to protect a woman’s right to an abortion). 
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the right deprived.  Legitimate expectations of privacy are particular-
ly well-suited as a dividing line, because they serve not just as a con-
sensus view of what is “private” but as a warning to individuals of 
where they must be wary of watchful eyes and where they may act 
freely.  The usual criticism that the test is circular—the government 
may pass a law allowing a practice of performing particular kind of 
search or may itself establish such a practice, thus rendering any ex-
pectation of privacy against that search necessarily illegitimate158—
may be a positive benefit in the informational privacy context.  It 
gives the democratically elected legislature a little more freedom to 
establish the limits of a right without clear textual guideposts, so long 
as it provides sufficient notice that society internalizes those limits.  If 
autonomy must be curtailed by collecting or disclosing information, 
“legitimate expectations” at least ensure that individuals are fore-
warned so that they can minimize the damage.  A balancing test 
would recognize that not all information is equally damaging to an 
individual’s interests in privacy, and therefore, not all disclosures 
should require the same level of countervailing government interest 
to justify them.  The European Courts, in other words, seem to have it 
right. 
The question then becomes from where this protection should 
come.  As already argued, legislatures and regulators have left gaps in 
this protection and may continue to do so indefinitely.159  The Fourth 
Amendment protects against “unreasonable searches and seizures”160 
but, at the very least, gives no guidance on whether information that 
was lawfully obtained may be disclosed.  This forces a court recogniz-
ing a right to informational privacy to rely on the same sorts of “pe-
numbras”161 that created protected zones for childbirth and sexuality 
absent express textual authority.162  But when the right to privacy is 
seen for its true potential as a right to personality, such an extension 
 
158 See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (Harlan, J., concurring) (recogniz-
ing the circularity of the legitimate expectations test). 
159 See infra Part II.B. 
160 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
161 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). 
162 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (holding that the Constitution pro-
tects the liberty of homosexuals to engage in sodomy); Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (relying on a 
“substantive component” absent from the literal text of the due process clause to protect 
the right to an abortion); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (recognizing a “guaran-
tee of certain areas or zones of privacy” that protects that right despite the lack of an ex-
plicit basis); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484–85 (holding that such penumbras in the First, 
Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments protect the right of married partners to use 
contraception). 
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of existing privacy and liberty rights no longer seems so far from es-
tablished precedents. 
Ideally, the legislature would provide clearly defined privacy rights 
that protect individuals from infringements by the executive.  If a 
general privacy right existed, the Equal Protection Clause could pro-
vide at least some protection to minority groups whose privacy is sin-
gled out.  But in the absence of such a law, executive actors may act 
with impunity in circuits that have not found a constitutional right.  
And in the absence of any guidance from the Supreme Court, circuit 
courts continue to reach disparate results based on intuition instead 
of coherent principles.  Following the European model, the Supreme 
Court could provide clear guidance to the lower courts on how and 
when to review executive action.  “Legitimate expectations of privacy” 
would allow actions clearly authorized by statute to escape scrutiny 
altogether because there can be no legitimate expectation that a stat-
ute will not be enforced.  But “legitimate expectations” would give 
the lower courts something more concrete to guide them than the 
hypothetical right and conflicting opinions they have now.  Govern-
ment action could receive deferential review appropriate to the reali-
ty that collecting and disseminating information can often be very 
useful to the government, but courts could still punish the egregious 
violations like purposeless disclosure of rape details,163 HIV status,164 
or sex tapes.165  And recognition that informational privacy is an im-
portant right could affect the Court’s decision-making when it bal-
ances that right against others.166  Regardless of what the legislature 
does, the law would benefit from a clear statement by the Court that 
the Constitution protects informational, and not just decisional, pri-
vacy. 
CONCLUSION 
European jurisprudence on informational privacy shows us that 
the right has the potential to be larger and more important than the 
 
163 Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 676, 686 (6th Cir. 1998). 
164 Doe v. Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 376, 385 (D.N.J. 1990). 
165 James v. Douglas, 941 F.2d 1539, 1541, 1544 (11th Cir. 1991). 
166 See, e.g., Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496–97 (1975) (invalidating a law pre-
venting the publication of the names of rape victims because the privacy interest of the 
victims was insufficient to support even the modest restriction of free press).  The deci-
sion in Cox Broadcasting turned on the fact that the name published was included in the 
public court record and therefore was no longer strictly private, id., but if privacy rights 
had stronger backing, the Court might have given greater weight to the state’s interest in 
protecting victims’ right to limit disclosure of such information to the few who scrutinize 
court records instead of the many who read the newspaper. 
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United States currently allows it to be.  It is about more than simply 
avoiding embarrassment and keeping the government out of our 
bedrooms.  It is about allowing individuals to keep secrets and to act 
without fear of being watched.  Without such a right, they are not 
free to behave as they wish for fear of being judged.  When this is 
recognized, it becomes apparent that existing state laws designed to 
protect only against falsities, broad disclosures, or extreme embar-
rassment are insufficient. 
It is easy to understand why the lower courts have been eager to 
find a constitutional protection of privacy.  But leaving the interpreta-
tion up to the lower courts is a flawed solution.  Without guidance on 
the scope or even the existence of the right, the lower courts have 
produced a morass of conflicting positions and left a hazy line that 
tells neither the government agent contemplating action nor the vic-
tim contemplating suit what side of that line a given action falls on.  
Without higher authority, many circuits are reluctant to extend the 
right as far as is deserved. 
Europe has benefitted from clear, legitimate, textual support for 
its right to privacy.  The United States would benefit from a similar 
level of guidance and protection.  The right to informational privacy 
is not so distinct from decisional privacy, the liberty right to an au-
tonomous space in which we are free to act without fear of intrusion 
either by government regulation or by prying eyes.  Only by protect-
ing both can we fully realize the complete right of privacy, that “most 
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized 
men.”167  When this is recognized, it no longer seems so implausible 
that the Constitution should protect that right any less than it pro-
tects a woman’s right to choose or a man’s right to romance another 
man. 
 
167 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
